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The limits of care and phronesis in teaching and coaching: dealing with personality disorder.  
Abstract  
My aim in this article is to contribute to the discussion about how teachers and coaches come to act 
in appropriate ways given the complex nature of both practices. I focus on two specific dispositions or 
qualities from the philosophical literature, namely the virtue of care and the Aristotelian concept of 
phronesis (or practical wisdom), which have been put forward as possible explanations. I argue that 
care and phronesis are fundamental qualities for both good teachers and coaches. Talk of care and 
phronesis in the literature is welcome, but these concepts are themselves complex.  Care and 
phronesis, like other virtues are context specific, difficult to acquire (or teach) and their particular 
expression depends on a host of complex factors, not least one’s character and personal and 
professional experience. I illustrate my argument with reference to a former professional football 
player who exhibited symptoms of personality disorder (PD) from an early age and who presented 
challenges to his teachers and coaches through his disruptive behaviour. .  
Introduction 
Bergman Drewe (2000) argues that where sport is concerned, there is an important overlap between 
teaching and coaching in terms of methods and goals. She argues that coaching will be the better for 
considering “attributes that are typically viewed as having to do with the ‘educational enterprise’” and 
physical education teachers (hereafter teachers) will be required to teach “skills, technique and 
strategy (…) if physical education is to fulfil its role as an educative practice” (Bergman Drewe 2000: 
79). Others (Nelson et al., 2014; Jones, 2007; and Penney, 2006) have also argued that the roles of the 
teacher and coach have much in common. The precise extent to which teaching and coaching are 
similar is not the chief concern of this paper, but rather the nature of the demands placed on teachers 
and coaches when undertaking their respective roles. There is widespread recognition that both the 
activities taught (sports) and the practices of teaching and coaching are complex. Jones (2007: 159) 
argues that “at the heart of coaching lies the everyday teaching and learning interface” and coaching 
is a “problematic, multifaceted and fundamentally intertwined with teaching and learning at the 
micro-interactive level”.  Light et al (2014:259) emphasise the complexity of decision making in team 
games like rugby means that teaching, coaching and learning ‘decision making’ involves “intellectual, 
emotional, affective and physical dimensions” in a given context and therefore requires a holistic 
player-centred approach. Given the complex nature of both teaching and coaching, one has to ask 
what is it that allows some teachers and coaches to be better than others. In this paper, I am not 
interested specifically in success at achieving certain aims to do with technical or tactical issues, but 
with broader issues around the interpersonal relationships and the well-being of athletes and pupils. 
What the ability to “get it right” (and there may be more than one way to get it right and certainly 
many ways to get it wrong) consists of is a question that has engaged psychologists, sociologists and 
educationalists interested in teaching and coaching.  How a particular teacher or coach develops or 
comes to possess the ability or abilities to “get it right” is similarly vexatious particularly when the 
issue relates to the well-being of an individual as opposed to more instrumental decisions (perhaps 
about how to structure a particular lesson).  One thing seems clear is that a formulaic, rule-like 
inflexible framework won’t fit the bill1. In this paper I evaluate two philosophical concepts put forward 
as candidates for the important attributes which characterise good teachers and coaches.  These 
qualities are the Aristotelian concept of phronesis or practical wisdom and the concept of care.  In 
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order to illustrate my analysis, I use a specific case study of George (pseudonym) - a talented footballer 
who became a chronic alcoholic. The case study provides examples of difficult behaviour. Faced with 
such behaviour a teacher or coach has to respond in a way that best exemplifies good teaching or 
coaching. The concepts of phronesis and care which form the basis of this article come from a moral 
philosophical tradition in general and a virtue ethical approach in particular. Authors like Cooke and 
Carr (2014), Carr (2001, 2005) and Jones (2005, 2008) have argued for an account of teaching which 
foregrounds the virtues and character of the teacher rather than, or above the technical skills or 
strategies they might develop or learn through their training. Recent contributions in Coaching have 
seen authors like Hardman et al (2010), Jones (2007) and Standal and Hemmestad (2011) argue against 
a technical hegemony in coach education advocating instead a focus on the coach as a person.  The 
shared belief is that it’s the personal qualities of the coach or teacher that allows them to act and 
respond appropriately. Against this background two concepts have been discussed in more detail. The 
first is phronesis.   Cooke and Carr (2014) and Standal and Hemmestad (2011) have argued that 
Aristotle’s phronesis - or practical wisdom -  is a key personal attribute which allows its possessor to 
choose an appropriate response, or in Aristotle’s terms to choose the means which bring about a 
particular good or the “right” outcome.  In other words, the practically wise teacher or coach is able 
to choose the right action/intervention/response at the right time for the right reason.  The second 
attribute, namely the virtue of care, has been discussed by authors such as Jones (2009), Jones et al 
(2013) and Hoveid and Finne (2014) among others.  A caring teacher or coach is motivated and able 
to act in the best interest of the pupil or athlete because they care about them. The concepts embody 
a clear sense of both the “ends” (what is worthwhile) and the means (the ways to bring about these 
ends) of both practices. In the next section I present extracts from a case study of a former professional 
footballer (George) who recalls presenting his teachers and coaches with numerous difficult 
situations. Following Plummer (2001), in examining particular aspects of the case I, aim to illustrate, 
illuminate and test the utility of the concepts of care and phronesis as they apply to coaching and 
teaching.  Most philosophical discussion uses hypothetical examples or personal anecdotes to 
illustrate and test the veracity of certain concepts and ideas.  Following the example of Jones et al 
(2014), however, I am using data which I had collected for a previous study for this purpose. 
 
George’s story – a case study 
George (pseudonym) is a recovering alcoholic with over 10 years of sobriety.  He was a talented 
football player and was signed by a professional British club when he was 16 in the early 1990s. The 
brief extracts presented here are selected from over five hours of unstructured interview data.  
George’s story in its entirety tracks his early problems with school, family, his emotional volatility and 
his obsessive personality through his short career as a professional footballer and the onset of 
alcoholism through a dark and chaotic period of chronic addiction (and all that entails) which led him 
to rehab in his late twenties. Following a stint of rehab, his story illustrates the ongoing daily 
experience of staying sober and building a new life (see Jones 2014 for an extended account of his 
story including the methods used, the analysis and the findings of the case study).  For the purpose of 
this article I select specific recollections of his behaviour when being taught or coached. Even though 
George was a keen sportsman with a particular passion for football, his behaviour was often 
disruptive, aggressive and volatile. He gave his teachers and coaches numerous problems which they 
had to try and respond to in the best way they could.  
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Personality disorder (PD), “ism” and problematic behaviour 
George is unequivocal in his belief that he suffered from emotional problems from an early age which 
preceded his drinking, but which eventually played a part in using drink (as well as other substances 
and behaviours) to self-medicate. He refers to this as the “ism” - a frame of mind or attitude or a 
personality type which purportedly set him apart from his peers.   
I felt different I suppose, whether that's true or not - I can't tell that because I don't know how 
other people feel.   
His frustration manifested itself in various forms of anti-social behaviour such as aggression (throwing 
things in class and walking out), anger, rebelliousness and mischievousness often directed at teachers 
and coaches. In sharp contrast there was also a desperate desire to please or be liked by teachers and 
coaches which was counterproductive.   
I was trying to please people and I would swing between being very moody or doing too much 
and pissing people off, there was no balance there. I think sometimes people don't understand 
why a person reacts that way and rather than trying to nurture that, I think the games teacher 
-I don't think he liked me a great deal because of my self-seeking, trying to get him to like me 
and I think he saw that as a weakness...   
The key idea here is that George’s personality was different because it was disordered.  In other words 
he had various emotional and behavioural problems symptomatic of a personality disorder2. 
According to Pickard (2011a: 181) personality disorder occurs:  
…when the set of characteristics or traits that make a person the kind of person they are 
causes severe psychological distress and impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important contexts: the ways a person is inclined to think, feel, and act do them harm, directly 
or via the effects they have on relationships, work, and life more generally conceived.  
Personality disorders are a form of mental illness and come in a variety of different guises including  
cluster C types (anxious and fearful) which consist of “obsessive-compulsive, avoidant, and dependent 
PD” (Pickard 2011a: 182).  George certainly had some of these symptoms - he recalls a catalogue of 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour (weight loss, training, exercise, playing football): “I can remember 
doing an obsessive amount of exercise,” “I would train obsessively 3 times a day” “I have an obsessive 
mind” “obsessed with how I looked” “I was obsessed at that point with my weight” “I'd get so obsessed 
and so hard on myself about letting that one goal in” “I was obsessed as well with my hair” [fear of 
going bald]; avoidant behaviour (reading in class, going to school); “I drank to hide the way I felt, 
because I suppose inside I was quite shy and – although I put this arrogant front on- I had a big chip on 
my shoulder …it was protection from how I was truly feeling”; and dependent behaviours (inhaling gas, 
alcohol and later food, cigarettes and other drugs) “if I put a substance in that is addictive it sets of 
something in me which is like I can’t stop doing it, can’t stop thinking about it when I’m not doing it. I 
have an allergy in my body that seems to respond to that substance that sets off a cycle in motion – I 
can’t stop obsessing: my body needs it”.  For the purpose of this article, the key message from this 
case study is that George often behaved badly.  He was cheeky, disruptive, arrogant, rude, insolent 
and aggressive. But this behaviour was borne of disorder, not of malice or wickedness – he couldn’t 
help it - and there are relevant difference in terms of how we ought to evaluate such behaviour and 
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how we ought to deal or respond to the behaviour (person). If PD is a significant cause of bad 
behaviour, then this should temper our (teachers and coaches) moral evaluations and inform how we 
should deal/manage/approach/interact with a sufferer. Before discussing whether care and phronesis 
might help us both understand and guide the process of responding appropriately in such a case, I 
provide a general outline of both.  
Care  
A number of scholars have employed the concept of care, or caring to frame discussions about how a 
coach or teacher should orientate themselves in relation to the athlete or pupil (Fry and Gano-
Overway 2010, Hoveid and Finne 2014, Jones 2009, Jones et al, 2013, Noddings 2003). In other words 
they should care about their charges and act in ways that instantiate this attitude or commitment 
towards them.  The concept of care, or caring can be viewed in a number of ways.  For authors such 
as Gilligan (1982) and Noddings (2003) “care” represents a feminine moral outlook which stands in 
contrast to the dominant masculine rationalistic ethics of modernity.  An ethics of care in these terms 
focuses on “moral issues in terms of emotionally involved caring for others and connection to others” 
(Slote 2007: 1). Here then is an attempt to articulate morality in terms of an emotional attachment or 
connection with another rather than impartial detachment. Care is a kind of virtue or the product of 
virtues which manifests itself in concerning oneself with others and treating them well, not from any 
sense of duty, but from inclination or genuine concern for the person. Loland (2011: 21) anchors 
coaching in ethical perfectionism and argues that “each individual has a moral obligation to develop 
in virtuous ways his or her natural talents and predispositions and that each individual has the 
obligation to stimulate and encourage similar developments in others”. Carr (2007) similarly argues 
that cultivating care in teachers (among other virtues) is a vital goal. We want coaches and teachers 
to have the dispositions and qualities of character which manifest themselves in caring attitudes and 
behaviour towards their pupils and athletes. We want them to listen, try to help, look after, look out 
for and generally act in the best interest of the pupil or athlete.  
Noddings (2003: 16) argues that: “Apprehending the other’s reality, feeling what he feels as nearly as 
possible, is the essential part of caring from the view of the one-caring”. The coach/teacher –
athlete/pupil relationship is a caring one if both parties contribute – the carer engrossed in the cared 
for and the cared for receptive and responsive (Noddings 2003: 16). For Frankfurt (1982: 257) 
questions about care are questions about “what is important or, rather, what is important to us?”  We 
want our coaches and teachers to care in this sense too inasmuch as they care about the practice of 
teaching and coaching. Perhaps caring in the latter sense is a prerequisite for caring in the former 
sense:   
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He [sic] identifies himself 
with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and 
susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or 
enhanced. Thus he concerns himself with what concerns it, giving particular attention to such 
things and directing his behaviour accordingly (Frankfurt 1982: 260).          
I believe that teachers and coaches should care about their role vis a vis the intrinsic goals of teaching 
or coaching rather than for any instrumental benefit it might bring (money, prestige, security).  
Achieving the goals of teaching and coaching therefore also involves caring for pupils or athletes in 
the first sense. Fry and Gano-Overway (2010) argue that caring (providing a caring climate) is linked 
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to positive educational experiences and reflects the “athlete/child-centred” philosophy mentioned 
above.  This involves:  
…providing an overarching context that is characterized by engrossment (listening, accepting, 
and attending), motivational displacement (honouring interests, supporting and helping 
achieve goals, empowering), respect (trust, sensitivity) and, is consistent over time exudes a 
caring climate (295-296). 
It is perhaps self-evident that teachers and coaches should care about what they do and about who 
they teach/coach.  The key questions are how teachers and coaches develop the disposition to care 
(in both senses) and how any individual teacher or coach instantiates care at any given moment on 
the coal face so to speak. Carr (2001: 466) argues it would be “crass confusion to construe such 
improvements [becoming a (more) caring sort] or development in terms of the acquisition of loving 
or caring skills”. Cushion et al (2003) make a similar point in relation to the complexity of the coach’s 
knowledge and how it’s developed through experience, reflection and interaction over an extended 
period.    
Phronesis 
Teaching and coaching both demand flexibility, reflexivity and an ability to read and react to each 
unfolding situation.  Neither a stock of technical or scientific knowledge nor a set of recipes or 
checklists can replace the far more nuanced and perhaps intuitive insight characteristic of a good 
teacher or coach. Standal and Hemmestad (2011) believe the concept of phronesis or practical 
knowledge, (or sometimes translated as prudence) can usefully capture and demystify, without 
trivialising, this important (or perhaps the most important) aspect of coaching. They argue that: 
When coaches find themselves in problematic, ethically challenging situations, the coaches 
with phronesis will not appeal to predetermined, universal rules for the right actions. Instead, 
they will approach the situation with a sound balance between universal principles and the 
particular characteristics of the situation (Standal and Hemmestad 2011: 50).         
In these terms phronesis is revealed in the coach’s ability to act correctly, not only in a technical sense, 
but also more importantly in a moral sense.  In a similar vein Cooke and Carr (2014: 94) agree that 
“teachers need to acquire capacities for fine context dependent judgement”. As Standal and 
Hemmestad rightly recognise, phronesis is a complex concept and a form of rationality or knowledge 
distinguishable from technical and theoretical knowledge. They cite Aristotle’s definition of phronesis, 
namely: “…a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (Standal and 
Hemmestad 2011: 47) and following Carr (2003, 2007) guard against reducing phronesis to a “skill of 
situation-specific reasoning” (Standal and Hemmestad 2011: 49).  
If we look closer at Aristotle’s account of phronesis we see that it plays a crucial role in his overall 
theory of living a good life.  The good life for Aristotle is a life of virtue whereby the exercise of virtues 
like honesty and courage are not mere instruments to the good life (eudaimonia), but constitutive of 
it. Each virtue is a mean between two vices, for example courage is the mean between cowardice and 
recklessness.  What counts as virtuous action is to hit the mean in any given particular situation so as 
to do the right thing, at the right time, in the right way with the right feeling. Deciding in each particular 
case where the mean lies is where phronesis plays a part. “The mean is what prudence [phronesis] 
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determines to be the mean (…) it decides what is the virtuous thing to do here and now” (Simpson 
1997: 248). When George behaved badly in the class the teacher had to weight up George’s best 
interest, the interests of the rest of the class, the school and a plethora of other considerations and 
attempt to act in a good way.  Simpson (1997: 248-249) argues that phronesis is not a matter of 
reasoning or reflection, but of perception “judging the here and now is the work of perception” or in 
Aristotle’s words; “…these particulars need to be perceived; and this perception is intuition” (Aristotle 
2004: 161). So phronesis according to Simpson does not reason about what virtue requires in this 
particular case, but intuits it3. For Aristotle “…the full performance of a man’s function [eudaimonia] 
depends upon a combination of prudence and moral virtue; virtue ensures the correctness of the end 
at which we aim, and prudence that of the means towards it” so choice, decision or action “cannot be 
correct in default either of prudence or of goodness” (Aristotle 2004: 163).  
Phronesis therefore is not a quality or set of attributes that can be taught or acquired independently 
of a particular virtue or constellation of virtues. A prudent coach or teacher (with phronesis) is a 
virtuous coach or teacher, or as Dunne (1993: 277) argues, “in phronesis virtue is already present”.   
So when advocating that a coach and teacher have phronesis we are saying that the teacher and coach 
should be good in a moral sense (Cooke and Carr 2014).  For Carr (2003: 261)  
Thus, good teachers need to have acquired some mettle or firmness of purpose, to exhibit 
self-control in some degree of patience and control of temper, to weigh fairness to all against 
concern for the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of particular individuals, to be trustworthy 
and caring, to possess a fair measure of humility – tempered perhaps by a readiness not to 
take oneself too seriously  - as well as, it goes without saying, the kind of knowledge of and 
passion and enthusiasm for what is taught that can trigger such interest in others.     
Many of the qualities described above feature in Aristotle’s catalogue of virtues. Such a catalogue 
could be expanded, but the key virtues of care, trust, fairness, patience, even-temper and humility are 
crucial.  The good teacher or coach whose character is defined by these virtues will act rightly because 
they also have phronesis. Given that phronesis is part of virtue, the key question is how teachers and 
coaches acquire virtue. According to Simpson (1997: 250), Aristotle argued that we become good 
through our nature, habit and teaching. We have no control over our nature, but we can be taught if 
we first have developed virtuous dispositions through habituation or training. Alderman (1997: 156) 
argues that “one learns to be virtuous the same way one learns to cook, dance, play football and so 
forth and that is imitating people who are good at those sorts of things”. Exposure to numerous 
learning opportunities and personal and role-related experience is crucial (Cushion et al 2003).    
The caring teacher and coach 
Caring involves countless fine-grained, individual, particular, context sensitive virtuous acts.  In order 
to get this right (the right thing, at the right time, in the right way with the right feeling – hitting the 
mean) the teacher/coach must have phronesis (or prudence/practical wisdom)4. The general 
frameworks offered by these concepts are particularly promising. They appear to provide at least a 
partial explanation for the non-technical qualities needed by coaches and teachers to act and respond 
when executing their roles. They also tell us something about the goals of the teacher and coach, 
namely the “good” of the athlete or pupil. There are, however a number of potential complexities that 
need to be considered.  I will outline two particular problems (partly psychological, partly 
philosophical) in the ‘abstract’ to begin with, before going on to illustrate the difficulties in relation to 
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the case study (Plummer 2001).  The first relates to the nature of care qua virtue. Is “care” a single 
virtue or does a person who cares have a range of other virtues such as compassion, honesty, integrity, 
empathy, humility, sensitivity whose combined effect is “caring”? Aristotle claimed that a person 
cannot have some moral virtues and not others but critics including Telfer (1990) and Flanagan (1991) 
have argued that this is implausible because achieving this level of moral excellence seems beyond 
the psychological reach of ordinary teachers and coaches (or any human agent for that matter).  
Flanagan (1991: 10) argues that a more plausible idea is that moral excellence is embodied in the 
possession of a small set of essential virtues accompanied by other non-essential virtues. Such a 
picture is better suited to our discussion of teachers and coaches, but the question remains about 
whether care is a single virtue or a collection of virtues.  If the former, is it a standard ‘universal’ quality 
or does it differ from person to person?  If the latter, are there essential constituent qualities or do 
everyone have their own “bag”?5   
The second complexity relates to the context sensitivity, universality or ‘globality’ of virtues (Flanagan 
1991: 279).  Do those who care do so in all situations? A teacher might care deeply for children who 
are keen, bright and engaging, but not for children who are difficult or disengaged. A coach might care 
for this athlete’s performance, but not their education or for this athlete’s skill but not their mental 
health. One might display faultless honesty in terms of financial matters, but display little or none at 
all on the football field. According to Flanagan (1991: 15) accounts of virtue and virtuous action are 
often “…insufficiently aware of the degree to which the virtues and vices are interest-relative 
constructs with high degrees of situation sensitivity”. To describe a person (teacher or coach) as caring 
‘across the board’ is to misunderstand the psychology of virtue. Flanagan’s concerns are well placed 
and point to the difficulties associated with both the scope and cultivation of virtues (and thereby 
phronesis) in relation to teaching and coaching6.  In particular they reinforce the idea that caring is 
neither a general-purpose skill nor a general purpose disposition that can be easily taught or acquired.       
Caring for George  
George presented his teachers and coaches with problematic and disruptive behaviour.  Given the 
discussion above good teachers and coaches should aim to care for George despite, or perhaps more 
so because of his problems. But how does talk of care in general translate to George’s experiences in 
particular. For a start, it would not have been easy for his teachers and coaches to care because he 
was not receptive or responsive to being cared for.  He was a difficult to manage.  
I remember getting constantly told off and done for my behaviour, but that wasn't necessarily 
always alcohol based stuff, but more with my arrogant sort of cocky way of being.  And I would 
get punished for that.   
I can remember the manager at that particular point saying to me “make me a cup of tea, the 
tea's in there, I want sugar as well”, all this stuff and I remember saying to him “well do you 
want me to fucking drink it for you as well” and he sent me out on the track and made me run 
round the track for hours  
Anti-social or “bad” behaviour is routinely met with some form of censure, punishment or discipline 
usually delivered with a “sting” of displeasure or condemnation. Punishment (or some form of 
discipline) has always been a crucial strategy in shaping and cultivating character and is a “kind of 
cure” for wrong doing (Aristotle 1980: 32)7. The use and benefit of punishment (especially harsh 
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punishment), however, is controversial, particularly in an educational setting and more so if the 
offender has difficulties like PD.  Caring and punishing are not necessarily incompatible; however, a 
caring teacher or coach should look to understand the motive or reasons behind the offending in order 
to help the offender.    
The teacher may therefore be in a dilemma; for he [sic] may insist on punishing an individual 
as a deterrent or (e.g. when he sends him out of the room) as a preventative measure; but he 
may know this will do no good to the individual punished.  He therefore has to tackle the 
problem on two fronts. He has to implement the threatened sanction without partiality; but 
he also has to do all he can to get to know and understand the individual offender (Peters 
1971: 274).   
If the offending is driven by an underlying personality disorder the right response is neither obvious 
nor easy to discern (as George testifies above). Can a caring coach who exercises phronesis discern 
correctly - whatever that may mean? Pickard (2011b) argues that even trained clinicians find it difficult 
to empathise with service users with PD because they often behave in aggressive, manipulative and 
harmful ways.  The natural reaction is to resent, punish and blame the service users. Such a response, 
however, is counterproductive and incompatible with the overarching non-judgmental philosophy of 
counselling and psychotherapy. Pickard (2011b) argues that clinicians aim to treat individuals firmly, 
but fairly and avoid any negative judgmental attitudes. A goal of therapy is to help PDs learn a different 
way of acting. Effective treatment demands hitting a mean or striking “a fine balance: responsibility 
without blame” (Pickard 2011b: 209). Striking this balance is difficult for clinicians despite extensive 
training and experience. It involves responding to the problematic behaviour fairly by holding the 
individual to account (perhaps following through with a pre-determined sanction [punishment]), but 
recognising that it is difficult for the individual not to act in that way and help them to develop 
alternative behaviour (get better). Coaches and teachers are not clinicians and will not normally have 
the same training or experience with PD. Neither are they engaged in a therapeutic context where 
one expects to find, or is presented with an individual with symptoms. Moreover, they may have other 
pupils or athletes in their care and have finite time and resources. Nevertheless in their role they are 
likely to engage with individuals with problems such as George and have a duty to do what they can 
to help them flourish or excel8. Good coaches and teachers are able to make a difference; even to 
individuals like George, but only if they have the requisite context sensitive dispositions to do so. It is 
difficult to stipulate what should be done because each situation is unique (which is why authors are 
talking about care and phronesis in the first place), but perhaps a gesture or a kind word, being 
prepared to listen, offering support are good starting points.  The situation might also require further 
action like looking for other avenues of expertise that might help the athlete or pupil.    
Seeing the problem 
Leaving aside what action or response is best there are prior difficulties related to “seeing” the 
problem. A difficulty with recognising personality disorder is that it is a psychiatric condition whose 
symptoms include anti-social behaviour. In fact certain PDs are diagnosed “via characteristics or traits 
that count as failures of morality or virtue and thus impair social, occupational, or other areas of 
interpersonal functioning” (Pickard 2011a: 183). A key issue for those dealing with individuals such as 
George therefore is seeing through the overt “bad” behaviour to the troubled mind beneath, but this 
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is not easy. Below I discuss two particular difficulties which militate against sensitivity of perception.  
The first is philosophical; the second is cultural.   
Other minds 
As mentioned above, in order for care to get off the ground, the teacher and coach must first see that 
this particular situation is one where the pupil or athlete is troubled rather than spiteful or malicious 
(or spiteful and malicious because they are troubled). The problem for teachers and coaches is 
summarised by George: “I didn’t have a head that was a greenhouse that they could look into me”. 
Without this perception (seeing) stage there is no chance of caring action. For Aristotle, this seeing 
element is implicated in any given virtue and is at least partly definitive of phronesis (above). The 
caring teacher or coach, therefore, is one who first sees a situation as an opportunity for caring action 
and along with phronesis they will be disposed to (and succeed) in acting in a caring way. George’s 
“greenhouse” observation above is simple yet profound and it gets to the heart of the problem of care 
(and other virtues). Accessing or apprehending “other minds”, knowing or understanding what it 
“feels” like to be you rather than me, is crucial for care and empathy. According to Slote (2007: 13) 
empathy “involves having the feelings of another (involuntary) aroused in ourselves, as when we see 
another in pain.” For Noddings (2003:16) caring involves “Apprehending the other’s reality, feeling 
what he feels as nearly as possible”. This disposition to apprehend is a crucial aspect of virtue in 
general and the virtue of care in particular and is included in the concept of phronesis. How any given 
individual comes to manifest the disposition in any concrete instance is a further example of the 
challenges discussed throughout this paper. The challenge is also an example of the problem of “other 
minds” or “subjective experience” widely discussed by philosophers. Perhaps the most well-known 
discussion is found in Thomas Nagel’s (1979) influential essay “what’s it like to be a bat?”  Nagel tackles 
the problem of consciousness arguing that organisms have conscious mental states “if and only if there 
is something that it is like to be that organism – something it is like for the organism” (Nagel 1979: 
166).  The extent to which another individual (teacher or coach) can know or apprehend “what it’s like 
for us” depends on how much subjects have in common with each other. Nagel (1979: 172) argued 
that:  
There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can 
know or say of another what the quality of the other’s experience is. They are subjective; 
however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for 
someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view 
– to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak.  
Care is predicated on the ability to see or feel another’s pain, distress or emotional state. This in turn 
seems to depend on the relative similarity between two subjects, in this case the teacher and pupil or 
coach and athlete.  Those not suffering from (or perhaps affected by) personality disorders might be 
perplexed or irritated by the seemingly irrational and selfish behaviour which George described.  ‘We’ 
non-sufferers (coaches, teachers, family, friends, journalists, academics and even therapists and 
psychiatrists) do not share the disorder and therefore cannot readily empathise with the mental 
experience and inner turmoil of people like George (of course some teachers and coaches may have 
experienced it and this has important implications which I discuss below). Without apprehending 
another’s pain, there can be no genuine empathy and without empathy – seeing the situation as it is 




The inability to apprehend the plight of individuals like George might be influenced by cultural 
ambivalence and confusion surrounding mental illness, particularly in the sporting context. Frank 
Bruno, the former world heavyweight boxing champion’s bi-polar illness was treated in 
characteristically insensitive fashion by elements of the British tabloid media with the Sun headline 
reading “Bonkers Bruno Locked Up”9. Nevertheless, there has been a welcome focus on mental health 
issues in general and in sport in particular. The Professional Football Association in the UK for example 
have raised the profile of mental health issues among football players and tried to break the stigma 
associated with conditions like bi-polar, anxiety, stress, depressive disorders and addiction.  The 
suicides of Robert Enke (German Goalkeeper) in 2009 and Gary speed the manager of Wales in 2011 
brought the issue into sharp focus in football, and Marcus Trescothick and Joe Root’s struggles with 
depression and stress have made the headlines in cricket over the last few years. Increased recognition 
and acceptance of the importance of mental health is further evidenced by the presence of 
psychologists and counsellors among the doctors, physiologists, physiotherapists and performance 
analysts surrounding modern professional athletes. George reflects on his time as a young 
professional:       
…it wasn’t the same as it is now- they have therapist, they have life coaches, they have all 
these different things because people are aware of the pressures that come with all these 
different things on that level, but I didn’t play at that level 
England took psychiatrist Dr Steve Peters to the football world cup in Brazil (2014)10.  His presence was 
largely designed to help success on the field, but there is recognition that to maximise performance, 
the athlete’s state of mind should be right. Individual teachers and coaches may have been exposed 
to a culture (in their everyday lives and through their roles) which is insensitive to or dismissive of 
mental health issues or individuals with mental health problems. Such difficulties may be exacerbated 
by the behaviour of the individual. PDs can be aggressive and obstinate, even in the face of kindness 
which further galvanises a suspicion or contempt for suffers. ..  
No I think, they [Coaches] didn’t realise that was a problem … because I didn’t tell them that, 
I just would be arrogant or I would be this sort of way- um cocky or bolshy or whatever word 
you’d want to use– quiet, moody – I would not allow others to get near me in that respect.  
When faced with an individual who is suffering from a personality disorder whose symptoms include 
behaving badly, the compassionate thing to do is to look to help the individual rather than condemn 
and blame.  Coaches and teachers may understand this in theory, but as I have argued may find 
difficulty in doing so in practice.  They may not be able to see or recognise the behaviour for what it is 
because they haven’t come across it before and/or they may have preconceptions about PD which 
makes it difficult for them to see the problem. Furthermore, even if they do see the behaviour for 
what it is, there is no guarantee that they can respond appropriately. 
What can be done? 
Care and phronesis are attributes, or more precisely dispositions that facilitate appropriate responses, 
but as I have shown the type of care which allows a teacher or coach to see that a pupil or athlete is 
suffering from disorder and respond in a way that promotes their well-being is complex (like any other 
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virtue).  A crucial requirement it seems is experience - either the same or similar experiences oneself, 
or experience with individuals who have had difficulties (in life before or outside teaching or coaching 
and/or in one’s role as teacher or coach). Experience of working with or seeing others responding 
successfully is also crucial.  It is through experience that one develops virtue and it is through 
experience with PD (or any other relevant factor ) that a teacher or coach predisposed to caring hones 
the “PD sensitive” virtue of care and develops “PD phronesis” in relation to individuals with 
behavioural problems... According to Dunne (1993: 292) experience plays a crucial role in both virtue 
and phronesis.  
…when a person is experienced we might say that the virtue through which he or she exploits 
that experience or puts what has been learned from it to work – and in the process learns 
more and so further develops and refines his or her experience – is phronesis.  Phronesis is 
what enables experience to be self-correcting and to avoid settling into routine.  If experience 
is an accumulated capital, we might say, then phronesis is this capital wisely invested.    
Just having experience of PD is not enough because it may be bad experience.  The experience has to 
have been a positive one where sensitivity and understanding was exemplified. But such experience 
without reflection or learning is not sufficient, however it is necessary in cultivating context sensitive 
virtue (and, by association – phronesis).  Accumulated encounters with different types of pupils and 
athletes in different situations, one’s own life story and experiences, one’s personality and character 
in addition to training, education and knowledge come together in a context sensitive disposition to 
care (the same process goes for any other virtue like honesty or integrity).. The virtuous practically 
wise coach and teacher, therefore, become so through a particular kind of experience and in turn that 
experience provides the “stuff” or the “capital” to care in “this case”. A focus on care and phronesis is 
vital, but I have shown that reference to these concepts in the abstract are no panacea for explaining 
how good teachers and coaches acquire them in concrete and are able to act and respond effectively 
in practice.  Care and phronesis are labels for complex context specific psychological mechanisms 
which develop through habit, reflection and perhaps most importantly experience.  To reiterate, 
neither care nor phronesis are “skills” or techniques that can be acquired easily and we may not be 
able to ‘teach’ them to coaches or teachers in any conventional sense. Although my aim has not been 
to comment directly on the implications for teacher and coach education, the foregoing discussion fits 
with the views of Carr (2003) Cushion et al, (2003) and Jones (2007) among others about the need for 
a non-reductive, non-technical approach.                     
Conclusion 
The virtue of care and the concept of phronesis have been put forward as important candidates for 
capturing the character or personality of good teachers and coaches.  I have argued that care and 
phronesis are indeed crucial, but there are theoretical and practical difficulties with these concepts 
that need working through.  Using insights from an empirical case study of an individual suffering from 
mental health issues (PD), I have tried to illustrate some of these difficulties.  I have argued that 
teachers and coaches might find it difficult to care for all pupils and athletes equally, particularly if an 
individual is behaving badly.  Yet care demands that they attempt to do the best for each individual 
(of course this does not mean that they treat everyone the same). Caring requires that we understand 
the person we care for, that we apprehend their reality and by caring we demonstrate that we do 
understand and apprehend their reality. This might be difficult if their realty is very different to ours 
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and/or if we have had little or no experience. Talk of care and phronesis in the literature is welcome, 
but we must not understate their complexity.  Care, like other virtues are context specific, difficult to 
acquire (or teach) and their particular expression depends on a host of complex factors not least 
character and personal and professional experience.   
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1 McNamee (2011) provides a detailed discussion about the limitations of frameworks/rules or codes in 
relation to coaching and codes of conduct.  My argument here echoes some of the key points he makes in 
relation to the character of a coach. 
2 George came to understand his early behaviour in terms of a personality disorder during his spell at the 
Sporting Chance rehabilitation clinic. http://www.sportingchanceclinic.com/ 
3 Simpson (1997: 249) like many other critics of Aristotle point out the circularity in the definition of phronesis 
or prudence: “If we ask who the virtuous are we are told they are those who have right intuition; if we ask who 
those with right intuition are, we are told they are the virtuous”.  
4 See Jones (2008) for an extended discussion about the nature of the virtues 
5 The “bag of virtues” idea comes from Kohlberg (1981) and was a phrase used to criticise the moral authority 
of a virtue theoretical approach to moral goodness. See Jones and McNamee (2000, 2003) and McNamee et al. 
(2003) for a rebuttal of this criticism. 
6 For further discussion about such issues, see Blum (1994) Chapter 3. 
7 Peters (1971) questions whether punishment has the positive role in the cultivation of character attributed to 
it by Aristotle.  
8 According to “Young Minds” a UK based mental health charity for young people, 1 in 10 children and young 
people aged 5-16 suffer from diagnosable mental health disorder, there is a 68% increase in self-harm hospital 
admissions in this age group in the last ten years and more than half of all adults with mental health problems 
were diagnosed in childhood with only half of this group receiving appropriate treatment. 
http://www.youngminds.org.uk/training_services/policy/mental_health_statistics accessed 19/11/2014.   
9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Bruno accessed July 15th 20014 
10 http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/27669031 accessed July 15th 20014 
                                                          
